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I.   FRED. A. ROWLEY FOR PETITIONER BRANDON BETTERMAN 
 
Mr. Rowley’s argument began with a general assertion that the 
Speedy Trial Clause applies through sentencing, claiming the Court has 
found before that the Clause guarantees an early and proper disposition of 
criminal proceedings. Amidst early questioning from Justice Ginsburg, he 
noted that both Barker v. Wingo1 and Smith v. Hooey2 have delineated 
interests protected by the Speedy Trial Clause that are unique to the 
convicted: rehabilitation; and the prejudice suffered by a defendant already 
incarcerated who then suffers a sentencing delay that causes him to lose 
the ability to seek a concurrent sentence. These interests set the theme for 
his argument: convicted defendants suffer real prejudice for which the 
Court must fashion a remedy.  
The discussion of a convicted defendant’s prejudice suffered after 
a sentencing delay was extensive and centered on the burden of proof 
necessary to prove it in court. The Justices keenly questioned him on the 
peculiar stance he fashioned on prejudice. The Justices wanted to 
understand why the prejudice interests of a convicted defendant would not 
be better served by asserting a violation of the Due Process Clause. Mr. 
Rowley reminded the Court that the Montana Supreme Court had analyzed 
that claim exactly for Mr. Betterman, but found he suffered no prejudice—
even though the Court had acknowledged his delay as extensive. Mr. 
Rowley argued that this was because the Montana Supreme Court, like 
other lower courts who refuse to apply the Speedy Trial Clause to 
sentencing concerns, applied the test developed in United States v. 
Lovasco3 instead of the Barker four-factor test. Mr. Rowley pointed out 
that a Lovasco-type analysis rarely, if ever, results in a finding favorable 
to a defendant because the Lovasco test places the burden on the defendant 
to make an affirmative showing of prejudice. A Barker-type analysis, 
however, would allow a reviewing court to presume prejudice and result 
in actual relief for affected defendants. Ultimately, he argued, this would 
make for smart policy because, as Justice Sotomayor agreed, most modern 
criminal fact-finding occurs during sentencing since most guilt 
determinations occur by way of plea bargain.  
                                           
1 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972). 
2 393 U.S. 374 (1969). 
3 431 U.S. 783 (1977). The Court in Lovasco acknowledged that pre-indictment delay did not fall 
under a Speedy Trial Clause analysis. Instead, the Court examined both the prejudice to the defendant 
and interests of the government as part of a balancing test under Due Process. During the analysis, the 
Court noted that “actual prejudice makes a due process claim concrete and ripe for adjudication[.]” 
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The Court seemed to agree that the types of sentencing delays 
Betterman suffered are indeed a problem, when they happen. Naturally 
then, if prejudice is shown or presumed, the Court must be able to fashion 
a remedy for it. Justice Ginsburg quickly called Mr. Rowley’s attention to 
this issue,4 implying that dismissal of charges would be an extreme remedy 
for someone who has been convicted. But Mr. Rowley argued that 
applying the Speedy Trial Clause after conviction need not be so 
constrained by the remedy used in the pre-trial setting; other options could 
apply, like vacating the remaining portion of the sentence, reducing the 
overall sentence by the amount of the delay, or by the amount of time the 
defendant suffers anxiety, or is deprived of rehabilitation programs.  
 
II.   DALE SCHOWENGERDT FOR THE STATE OF MONTANA, 
RESPONDENT 
 
Mr. Schowengerdt sought to frame the discussion of remedy and 
prejudice in the context of the Clause’s text and history. He argued that 
the right is essentially a limitation of the Government’s power to bring 
those who are presumed innocent to trial. If the Government delays, it 
forfeits that right. But a sentencing delay is different because it has no 
impact on the Government’s authority to try individuals and thus has no 
bearing on the interests protected by the Clause. There is no anxiety 
interest over public accusation at sentencing because at sentencing, the 
accusation is now confirmed; and after conviction, a convict is rightly 
deprived of his liberty. Justice Ginsburg was again first to question, 
asking, if she accepted his premise, when a delay would then become a 
Due Process violation. Mr. Schowengerdt rested his answer on requiring 
an affirmative showing of prejudice, arguing that the interests articulated 
by Mr. Rowley—loss of access to rehabilitation and parole—were far too 
speculative. Interestingly, he related to the Court that Betterman himself 
had proved this point. Betterman was offered parole in March of 2014 on 
the condition he complete a rehabilitation program. Betterman quit only 
sixteen days later and the court rescinded his parole. Such speculative 
interests are too volatile to be assured a remedy.  
But Justice Kagan reminded Mr. Schowengerdt that there is 
another interest of a defendant awaiting sentencing. Convicted defendants 
awaiting sentencing face the possible impairment of their defense as time 
passes, just like defendants who suffer pre-trial delays. This is a central 
concern, she said, because the modern criminal justice system now 
revolves around the plea agreements and sentencing instead of trial. This 
language sounded remarkably like an argument advanced in the 
Petitioner’s brief: that sentencing hearings are like mini-trials, and are 
likely to be the only real fact-finding done in the course of a prosecution. 
                                           
4 The remedy for a Speedy Trial Clause violation is dismissal with prejudice. Barker, 407 U.S. at 522. 
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Mr. Schowengerdt countered by asserting that Due Process and the Writ 
of Mandamus (to compel sentencing) are still avenues for relief, and that 
sentencing hearings are different from trials because the rules differ; there 
is no beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof; the Confrontation Clause 
does not apply; the facts are usually not at issue; and importantly, the 
accused is now convicted—there is no longer a presumption of innocence 
to protect.  
Having explored the scope of the interests potentially at issue, the 
Court questioned Mr. Schowengerdt on how that prejudice should be 
analyzed. Mr. Schowengerdt argued for a Due Process analysis under 
Lovasco, but Justice Breyer presented him with an interesting point—why 
not allow the delay claims to be brought under the Due Process Clause, 
but instruct courts to apply a Sixth Amendment-type analysis by using the 
Barker factors? Recall that Barker instructions are to weigh (1) the length 
of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of 
his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.5 Mr. Schowengerdt’s 
objection went to the showing of prejudice. Prejudice for a sentencing 
delay should not only be at the forefront of the factors, he asserted, it 
should be a necessary factor. Barker factors are not each necessary in a 
pre-trial setting, he reminded the Court. But if they are to be applied for 
sentencing concerns, then an affirmative showing of prejudice must 
become a necessary factor.  
 
III.   GINGER D. ANDERS, ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL FOR THE 
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, AS AMICI SUPPORTING RESPONDENT. 
 
Ms. Anders’ initial contention was simple—at least for the 
impairment of defense concern—the Due Process Clause provides an 
adequate avenue of relief for these types of injuries, and the standard of 
showing prejudice should be the same as that articulated in other violations 
of constitutional rights. A defendant should have to show that the outcome 
would have been different had he not suffered the prejudice. Justice Kagan 
did not see how this differed from a Barker analysis, but Ms. Anders 
reminded her that Barker allows a reviewing court to presume prejudice 
so no showing of a different outcome would be required. Ms. Anders 
contended that prejudice should not be presumed for sentencing delays 
because of the likelihood that the remedy for it—lowering the sentence—
interferes with a court’s imposition of an appropriate sentence: “it’s 
appropriate to require the defendant to show some actual injury in order to 
justify the societal cost of lowering [a] sentence.” But she argued too, that 
a convicted defendant’s lack of a cognizable liberty interest supports no 
presumed prejudice.  
                                           
5 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–33. 
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Justice Sotomayor asked the logical follow-up question: how, if 
no prejudice is to be presumed, one should analyze the issue. Ms. Anders 
responded that, in the due process context, the defendant should 
necessarily be required to show an actual, cognizable effect on his Barker 
factor interests. Under a standard of probability that the result would have 
been different, he would have to show an effect on his defense at 
sentencing; or that he served a longer sentence than he should have. Under 
her Due Process rubric, access to rehabilitation programs, and anxiety 
would not be a cognizable prejudice. But still, Ms. Anders acknowledged 
that convicted defendants do at least have a Due Process interest in a 
“fundamentally fair sentencing proceeding.” Her main concern was really 
the substance of the right and its remedy—as long as the substantive right 
did not attach to the defendant’s liberty interest (since he should have none 
as a convict), and the remedy did not mean vacatur of sentence, where the 
right fell among the Constitutional clauses was of little concern to her. But 
in the end, she claimed the Due Process clause captures the right most 
succinctly, providing both a substantive right, and a satisfyingly tailored 
remedy.  
 
IV.   MR. ROWLEY’S REBUTTAL FOR PETITIONER BRANDON 
BETTERMAN 
 
On rebuttal, Mr. Rowley reminded the Court that a Lovasco-type 
analysis, where prejudice may not be presumed, would result in a system 
where only an actual impairment of defense would result in prejudice 
being shown. But again, the Court has recognized before other forms of 
prejudice unique to those who have been convicted. Delays in follow-up 
prosecutions, as in Smith, where the defendant is already incarcerated are 
particularly ill-suited to a Lovasco test. The interest in rehabilitation 
recognized in Barker could be impinged by delays in prosecution as well. 
He argued further that the Barker factor test would be better suited for 
sentencing delays because it would actually address rehabilitation and 
anxiety concerns, whereas the Lovasco test would simply ignore them. 
And these concerns are actually heightened because, as the Respondent 
contended, sentencing is different. Sentencing is the only place in the 
modern criminal justice system where the defendant really challenges the 
prosecution or even mounts a defense. So it is there at sentencing where a 
convicted defendant’s interest in access to rehabilitation programs is most 
keen. Thus, Barker would be the appropriate framework, and the proper 
right in which to “to ground that analysis” would be the Sixth Amendment.  
 
V.   ANALYSIS 
 
The Court seemed almost resigned to the idea that the right for a 
speedy sentencing, if it exists, would likely apply under the umbrella of 
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the Due Process Clause instead of the Speedy Trial Clause. Yet the Court 
seemed intrigued by Justice Breyer’s thought that the right might originate 
under Due Process, but incorporate a speedy trial analysis consistent with 
the Barker factors. This quasi-Sixth Amendment solution might satisfy 
both sides in terms of the analysis and establishment of the right, as long 
as the State is satisfied that the defendant’s liberty interests will not be part 
of the test. The State’s objection to the defendant’s liberty interests as part 
of the analysis ties into concerns over the remedy—the State does not want 
convicted defendants receiving sentence credit as the result of procedural 
delays or case backlogs. Nonetheless, the Court seems poised to identify 
the right and there are only so many ways a violation of it can possibly be 
remedied. Credit for time or sentence reduction is convenient and logically 
tied in many ways to the nature of the violation. As both parties 
acknowledged during argument, modern criminal proceedings revolve 
around negotiation of plea agreements. In the Court’s eyes, the 
commonality of plea bargaining likely lessens the societal interest in 
preserving a lower court’s original sentence when chipping away at it will 
remedy a Constitutional infirmity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
